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Mont. 489, 31 Pac. (2d) 729 (1934); contra, Buck v. Buck, 6o
111.241 (x8 7 1); Dickeyv.Dickey, 15 4 Md. 6 7 5, 14 1A. 3 87 (1928);
Parker v. Parker, 55 Cal. App. 458, 203 Pac. 420 (1921). Though
the stipulations of the parties to alimony are usually adopted, the court
is not bound by them. Warren v. Warren, i i6 Minn. 458, 133 N.W.
1009 (1902). The contract is merely an advisory instrument for the
court, depending on the court's approval for its legal efficacy and effect.
Hayes v. Hayes, 75 S.W. (2d) 614 (Mo., 1934). Neither the parents
nor the court itself can deprive the court of its continuing jurisdiction
over the welfare and maintenance of minor children in divorce action.
Barrett v. Barrett, 39 Pac. (2d) 621 (Ariz., 1934). Considering the
social significance of these cases, the result is much to be preferred to
that based upon the impairment of the obligation of contact argument.
The recent case of Newkirk v. Newkirk, 129 O.S. 543, 196 N.E.
146 (935), without opinion, permitted a deduction in the divorce de-
cree and relied on Corbett v. Corbett, supra, as their authority. How-
ever, there was a conflict as to the existence of a contract between the
parties. In Higbee v. Higbee, another case decided without opinion on
October 23, 1935, the Supreme Court refused a motion to certify the
record of the lower courts. The Common Pleas and Court of Appeals
had held that the court had no jurisdiction to permit a decrease in the
obligation of the parties to the contract except upon showing duress or
fraud. Did the Newkirk case change the Ohio existing law? The Ohio
Supreme Court by failing to write an opinion in the last two cases has
missed an opportunity to lay down a definite rule on the subject in the
State of Ohio. Perhaps, from Newkirk v. Newkirk, supra, we may
infer that Ohio will tend to follow the recent trend of decisions of the
other states, i.e., a divorce decree that has embodied a contract of the
spouses for alimony for the wife and support of the child can be de-
creased or increased if the necessary circumstances are found for either.
HARRY A. GOLDMAN.
INTEREST
GRANTED BECAUSE OF UNREASONABLE DELAY IN PAYMENT TO
CREDITOR OF DECEDENT.
One Haskenkamp died Dec. 20, 1925. J. M. Murray, having a
claim for funeral services and expenses, presented the will for probate
on two different occasions, both times in the court of the wrong county.
The will was finally sent to Hamilton County, where the decedent had
lived, and was admitted to probate. The administrator had tendered the
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principal sum on several occasions, but Murray had refused the amount
unless the interest was paid. Murray started suit on Nov. 7, 1930. The
Court of Appeals for Hamilton County held that Murray was entitled
to interest on the claim against the estate, due to the fact that there was
an unreasonable delay in administration. Hawke, Admr., v. Murray, 47
Ohio App. 38o, 191 N.E. 884, 40 O.L.R. 318, 16 Abs. 302 (1933).
An early New York case stated that executors and other trustees are
chargeable with interest if they were negligent in not paying over money
due from estates. Dunscomb, et al., v. The Executors of Dunscomb, i
Johns. Ch. 5o8 (I815). Interest is allowed for the breach of a con-
tract, or when some duty is violated. Gordon Newel v. Executor of
Caroline Keith, II Vt. 214 (1839). Interest is an incident to "just
compensation" where liability has its origin in the obligation of a con-
tract. Prager v. N. J. Fidelity and Plate Glass Ins. Co. of Newark,
N. J., 245 N.Y. I, 156 N.E. 76, 52 A.L.R. 193 (1927). The law
assumes that interest is the measure of damages for delay in the payment
of money that is due. Loudon v. Taxing District, 104 U.S. 771, 26
L.Ed. 923 (I88I); In re Ashland Emery and Corundum Co., 229
Fed. 829 (1916); Young v. Godbe, 15 Wall. 562, 21 L.Ed. 250
(1872); Henderson Cotton Mfg. Co. v. Lowell Machine Co., 86 Ky.
668, 7 S.W. 142 (I888). Where a party is guilty of unreasonable
and vexatious delay in making payment of a just claim, the debt is
chargeable with interest. Chicago v. Tebbetts, 104 U.S. 120, 26 L.Ed.
655 (1881); Igency of Canadian Car and Foundry Co., Limited, et
al., v. A4merican Can Co., 258 Fed. 363, 6 A.L.R. 1182 (1919). The
above cases clearly show that whenever a debtor is in default for not
paying money, justice requires that he should indemnify the creditor.
and such damage is given in the form of interest. Interest has been
held recoverable as of right where money has been improperly retained.
Other courts have held such a right exists only where it can be implied
from the nature of the promise, or is expressly reserved, but when it is
given as damages it is a matter of discretion. Miller v. Robertson, 266
U.S. 243, 45 Sup. Ct. 73, 69 L.Ed. 265 (1924); 15 R.C.L. io.
An early Ohio case stated that an administrator is not chargeable
with interest unless he is guilty of unreasonable and unnecessary delay
in the settlement of his accounts. Thomas W. Cooch, et al., v. Irwin,
Admr., 7 Ohio St. 22 (1857). Assets in the hands of an administrator
which are tied up by litigation in good faith do not bear interest. James
v. West, Adm., et al., 67 Ohio St. 28, 65 N.E. 156, 47 W.L.B. 857
(1902). A certain statute enacted in Ohio in 1869, was not cited in
the latter case. "* * * when money becomes due and payable upon any
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bond, bill, note, or other instrument of writing, upon any book account,
or settlement shall be entitled to interest at the rate of six per cent per
annum, and no more." Ohio G.C., Sec. 8305. This section of the code
may have been applicable to the case of James v. West, and also the
principal case. If so, it seems that it would not have affected the decisions
beyond setting the rate at which interest is allowable.
The courts are in conflict as to the time when interest begins to
run. Some courts hold that interest begins to run from the time the
money should have been paid, and not from the time that the delay
became unreasonable. C. TV. Ribble v. C. Bullion, et al., 87 Neb. 700,
128 N.W-. 32, 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 350 (910); Chicago v. Tebbetts,
supra; Minard v. Beans, 64 Pa. 411 (1870); Young v. Godbe, supra.
Other courts have allowed interest only from date of demand. Shepard
N. The City of New York, 216 N.Y. 251, 11o N.E. 435, Ann. Cas.
I917C, io62 (915); Necedah Mfg. Corp. v. Juneau County, 2o6
Wis. 316, 237 N.W. 277, 96 A.L.R. 4 (193I); Agency of Canadian
Car and Foundry Co., Limited, et al., v. American Can Co., supra. In
the principal case, the court, in its discussion, said, "There is no direct
controlling authority in this state announcing when interest shall begin
to run upon the claim for funeral expenses." The undertaker asked for
interest from Feb. 21, 1926, which apparently was allowed. Allowing
interest from the date the claim was due, is probably the fairest method.
The principal case was inclined to follow that method.
In the principal case the undertaker was allowed interest, although
he might have avoided the delay, by probating the will earlier in the
proper court. Where a party allows the claim to lie dormant for a.
long time, it is unreasonable that interest should be added, so long as
the delay was due to the fault of the creditor. Redfield v. Ystalyfera
Iron Co., iio U.S. 174, 3 Sup. Ct. 570, 28 L.Ed. io9 (1883); 33
C.J. 19o. In view of the fact that the undertaker in the principal case
made some efforts to probate the will, though his efforts were ineffectual,
it might be suggested that the case be distinguished from cases where
interest was not allowed, on two possible grounds: First, that the
funeral director did not allow the claim to lie dormant in an unreason-
able manner, since he made some effort. Second, courts are anxious to
close up estates as soon as possible, and are more apt to allow the interest
as a penalty for the delay, than would be true in ordinary contract cases.
SAM TOPOLOSKY.
